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Abstract 
 
Several philosophers have inquired into the metaphysical limits of conceptual 
engineering: ‘Can we engineer? And if so, to what extent?’. This paper is not 
concerned with answering these questions. It does concern itself, however, 
with the limits of conceptual engineering, albeit in a largely unexplored sense: it 
cares about the normative, rather than about the metaphysical limits thereof.  
 I first defend an optimistic claim: I argue that the ameliorative project 
has, so far, been too modest; there is little value theoretic reason to restrict the 
project to remedying deficient representational devices, rather than go on a 
more ambitious quest: conceptual improvement. That being said, I also identify 
a limitation to the optimistic claim: I show that the ‘should’ in ameliorative 
projects suffers from a ‘wrong-kind-of-reasons’ problem.  
 Last but not least, I sketch a proposal of normative constraining meant 
to address both the above results. The proposal gives primacy to epistemic 
constraints: accordingly, a concept should be ameliorated only insofar as this 
does not translate into epistemic loss.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Several philosophers think that we should set aside our ambition to describe 
the world and, instead, engage in prescriptive projects: for instance, that we 
should stop trying to figure out precisely what our concept of knowledge 
depicts and, instead, work towards answering the question: ‘what should our 
concept of knowledge be like?’. According to many of the champions of this 
prescriptive turn, that is the philosopher’s true job to begin with. Here is Matti 
Eklund, for one: 
 
[...W]hile philosophers often have been concerned with our actual 
concepts or the properties or relations they stand for, philosophers 
should also be asking themselves whether these really are the best 
tools for understanding the relevant aspects of reality, and in many 
cases consider what preferable replacements might be. 
Philosophers should be engaged in conceptual engineering. 
Compare: when physicists study reality they do not hold on to the 
concepts of folk physics but use concepts better suited to their 
theoretical purposes. Why should things stand differently with 
what philosophers study? (Eklund 2014. 2930) 
 
According to Sally Haslanger, too, we should look into the function of our 
concepts, and engineer them accordingly: 
 
[…W]e begin by considering more fully the pragmatics of our talk 
employing the terms in question. What is the point of having these 
concepts? What cognitive or practical task do they (or should they) 
enable us to accomplish? Are they effective tools to accomplish 
our (legitimate) purposes; if not, what concepts would serve these 
purposes better? (Haslanger 2000, 33) 
 
Now, one central concern for champions of the ameliorative project concerns 
the metaphysical limits thereof: Can we even get the project off the ground, i.e. 
can we act on the concepts we have? What strategies are there available for 
amelioration? Does this not clash fragrantly with any form of semantic 
externalism?  Do we need to change the world in the process?  How is the 
continuity of inquiry and communication going to be affected by this? These 
are but a few questions any project aiming to engineer our representational 
devices needs to answer; they all, in a nutshell, amount to asking: ‘Can we 
engineer? And if so, to what extent?’. Several people have asked these 
questions in the literature, and several people have tried to answer them.1 
 This paper is not concerned with answering these questions. It does 
concern itself, however, with the limits of conceptual engineering, albeit in a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  For	  discussion,	  see	  e.g.	  (Cappelen	  2017),	  (Greenough	  2017).	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largely unexplored sense: it looks into the limits of the ‘should’ involved in the 
ameliorative project, rather than into the limits of the corresponding ‘can’. It 
cares about the normative, rather than about the metaphysical limits of the 
engineering project. It asks the following questions: even if we assume that we 
could engineer representational devices, should we? What is/are the source/s 
of this normative constraint? What are its limits? 
 Here is what I will do in what follows:  in the next section (#2), I first 
outline a series of normative sources centrally featured in the conceptual 
engineering literature. Further on, I defend an optimistic claim: I argue that the 
ameliorative project has, so far, been too modest; that is, value-theoretically 
unjustifiably modest. There is little reason, I argue, to restrict the project to 
remedying deficient representational devices, rather than go on a more 
ambitious quest: conceptual improvement. That being said, in section #3, I 
also identify a limitation to the optimistic claim: I show that the ‘should’ in 
ameliorative projects suffers from a ‘wrong-kind-of-reasons’ problem: in a 
nutshell, it looks as though not just any improvement legitimizes engineering a 
perfectly consistent, functional concept. If that is the case, though, the 
ameliorative ambition is in need of normative constraining. In the last section 
(#4), I put forth a sketch of a proposal to this effect, what I call the ‘Epistemic 
Limiting Procedure’ (ELP). The proposal gives primacy to epistemic normative 
constraints: according to ELP, a concept should be ameliorated only insofar as 
this does not translate into epistemic loss. In section #5 I answer two 
objections to the proposed account, and in the last section I conclude.   
 
 
2. Engineering Good Concepts 
 
Several normative incentives have been put forth in support of conceptual 
amelioration in the literature. Largely though, they all have one thing in 
common: they draw their normative force from extant conceptual deficiencies 
of sorts. Other than that, the reasons to engineer are a type-diverse bunch. 
Here is Patrick Greenough (2017) on this: 
 
Conceptual defects are many and varied. Concepts (and terms) can 
be incomplete (‘open-textured’), confused, unsatisfiable, vague, or 
inconsistent. They can be too inclusive, too narrow, or simply 
empty. They can be too complex, too simple, or not fit to feature 
in any useful explanation; they can be superseded, tired, 
hackneyed, or systematically misapplied. They can be too 
parochial, too elitist, or too recondite. They can be loaded with 
inappropriate connotations, bad ideological baggage, or serve as 
ongoing devices for deceit, discrimination, or oppression. A 
concept may be flawed on more than one dimension—broken in 
many different ways. Conceptual Engineering, as a result, is a 
multifarious business (Greenough 2017, 3). 
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To have some normative picture to start from, it will be very helpful to look at 
Herman Cappelen’s (2017) tentative taxonomy of conceptual deficiencies. 
After all, it is plausible to think that the relevant types of ‘should’ involved in 
the engineering proposals will correspond to the types of deficiencies meant to 
address. According to Cappelen, on a first approximation, a concept is in need 
of engineering either when it fails semantically – cases of nonsense, 
incoherence, inconsistency, maybe even vagueness – or when, even though the 
concept does not fail semantically, employing it has detrimental effects.  
 Let us start by taking a closer look at the case of semantic failure. 
Notably, one central concern of engineers has been with fixing concepts taken 
to be inconsistent; the concept of ‘truth’, for instance, is a fashionable target of 
ameliorative ambitions, due to liar-paradoxicality (see e.g. [Sharp 2013]). The 
concept of ‘freedom’ is also pretty popular in the literature on inconsistency 
counts, due to being taken by many to be incompatible with both determinism 
and indeterminism (van Inwagen 2008). Arguably, the main deficiencies at 
stake in these examples are semantic and epistemic deficiencies; the concepts 
fail us semantically and, thereby, are likely to be conducive to obstacles in 
inquiry. Plausibly, the corresponding ‘should-s’ in the engineering proposals 
will follow suit: we will have semantic and epistemic reasons justifying our 
ameliorative proposals.  
 There are also more practical concerns that the engineering ambition 
aims to address. Concepts can be semantically innocent, but have detrimental 
effects in other walks of life. These non-semantic detrimental effects able to 
justify amelioration are a diverse bunch; Cappelen identifies three broad 
categories:  first, there are morally, politically or socially detrimental effects. For 
instance, the fact that ‘marriage’ has an extension that excludes same-sex 
couples has such bad effects. Similarly, according to Sally Haslanger, 
engineering our current concept of ‘woman’ would be good for political 
reasons. More specifically, Haslanger’s political goal is the elimination of 
women: ’[…] I believe it is part of the project of feminism to bring about a day 
when there are no more women’ (Haslanger 2000, 46).  
 Crucially, in the case of social and political effects, according to 
Cappelen, one can be metaphysically justified to attempt amelioration, in virtue 
of the fact that the extensions of terms are taken to be constitutive of social 
reality. On Searle’s view, for instance, ‘[...] language is essentially constitutive of 
institutional reality. […It is] impossible to have institutional structures such as 
money, marriage, governments, and property without some form of language 
because [...] the words or other symbols are partly constitutive of the facts’ 
(Searle 1995, 59). Thus, on such a view of social reality, one can have moral, 
social, political reasons to engineer the relevant concepts pertaining to 
deficiencies present at the level of the relevant institutions. 
 However, this need not be the case: even if you don’t think meanings 
of words are constitutive of social reality, you can still be justified in 
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engineering if, as a matter of empirical fact, the divisions and classifications we 
make will have very significant social effects. 
 Second, according to some philosophers, the use of certain kinds of 
expressions might have a negative cognitive effect on those using those 
expressions (Sarah Jane Leslie, forthcoming)). The expressions Leslie discusses 
are generics – for instance ‘muslims’, or ‘african americans’ -, and the mistake 
is that of essentializing social kinds, i.e. enhance the extent to which people 
expect the individual to conform to a stereotype.  
 Thirdly, there are effects on theorizing: According to Clark and Chalmers 
(1998), for instance, we have a notion of belief that is too internalist and thus 
blocks the extended mind hypothesis and makes it hard to develop a 
systematic theory of the mind; there’s nothing semantically wrong with the 
non-externalist notion, but using it is likely to result in a non-unified theory. 
 Now, this tentative taxonomy need not, of course, cover all the 
possible justificatory reasons for proposing engineering; rather, it offers a very 
useful map of extant attempts and their normative resources. The reason why 
it is useful to look at it is because it enables us to see interesting patterns 
pertaining to the normativity at work.  
 First, we have seen that, one plausible way to identify the ‘should(s)’ at 
stake in a particular engineering proposal is by looking at the targeted 
deficiencies: defects of a particular type T will be associated with justifications 
of type T; epistemic deficiencies will correspond to an epistemic justification 
for amelioration; moral defects suggest an associated moral ‘should’ and so on. 
The type association seems overwhelmingly plausible and nicely maps on to 
the way in which the general normative landscape seems to work: if I have a 
false belief, for instance, my belief is epistemically deficient, so the ‘should’ 
involved in my obligation to abandon or revise it is an epistemic ‘should’. 
Similarly, a broken speedometer is prudentially (and legally) deficient, so there’s 
a prudential (and legal) ‘should’ at stake in my obligation to fix it.  
 One aspect of this association between ‘defects of type T’ and ‘‘should-
s’ of type T’, however, that does not come across as equally value theoretically 
innocent is the following idea that seems to implicitly underlie the extant 
ameliorative projects: defects of type T are needed for justifications of type T.  
That is, if we look at the taxonomy above, we will notice that it is built around 
the type of defect at stake: champions of various engineering proposals start 
with identifying a (morally, epistemically etc.) deficient concept, and then 
propose that we should revise it in one way or another. Finally, the engineer 
argues that the proposed revision will have this or that (morally, epistemically 
etc.) good consequence.  
 It is here, however, where the engineering normative picture does not 
seem to fit that well with general normativity: on most normative pictures in 
the literature, for all phi, what T-justifies phi-ing is a T-type improvement, not 
a T-type defect. If it’s morally better for me to give money to charity than to 
not give money to charity, than I am justified in giving money to charity. It 
need not be that I am thereby remedying some moral defect. If it is 
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prudentially better that I go to Mary’s party tonight, than I am prudentially 
justified in going to Mary’s party tonight.  
 If that is the case, however, it is less than clear why engineers have 
been modestly restricting ameliorative ambitions to fixing language, rather than 
improving language. After all, say that there was nothing wrong with our 
concept of ‘woman’, semantically, morally, politically or otherwise; say that it is 
a perfectly coherent concept, and its current shape has zero detrimental effects 
on women’s moral, political or epistemic life. Say, however, that it could be 
engineered such as to substantially improve women’s life. Should we not 
attempt to do so? To see this more clearly, think also of a closely related 
branch of engineering, i.e. social engineering: do we need our social institutions 
to be somehow deficient in order to be justified in proposing amelioration 
projects, or is it enough if changing our social institutions will have a positive 
effect on our lives?2   
 The upshot of this is a fairly optimistic picture concerning the 
normative limits of the engineering project: we should broaden up! Conceptual 
engineering need not merely draw its normative support from defects of our 
representational devices; proposals of improvement for perfectly functional 
concepts will do just as well.  
 Note, also, crucially, that all this is not to say that the said authors 
would not happily embrace this wider picture;3 to the contrary, I would expect 
both champions and foes of conceptual engineering to agree that, if we are 
justified and/or able to engineer at all, there is little to no reason to think that 
the modest, ‘mere fixing’ project, enjoys more justificatory support than the 
wider picture here proposed.  
 
 
3. The Wrong Kind of Reasons for Amelioration 
 
We have seen that there is little normative reason for engineering projects to 
stay modest: improving good concepts is just as well supported by the extant 
arguments in favor of the engineering ambition as is fixing deficient ones.  If 
we care about the consequences of employing a particular concept for our 
moral, social, political, cognitive etc. life, we are just as justified in avoiding bad 
consequences as we are in seeking better ones. Or so the rest of the normative 
landscape seems to suggest.  
 What I will argue next, however, is that broadening up from fixing 
language to conceptual improvement also reveals 4  one important value-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Of	   course,	   strictly	   speaking,	  T-­‐justification	  does	  not	   supervene	  on	  T-­‐obligation,	  but	  rather	   on	   T-­‐permissibility.	   The	   question,	   however,	   remains:	   why	   is	   the	   conceptual	  engineer	  is	  in	  the	  business	  of	  ameliorating	  concepts	  that	  are	  in	  need	  of	  amelioration,	  rather	  than	  ameliorating	  concepts	  that	  can	  be	  ameliorated.	  	  3	  Cappelen	  and	  Greenough	  (pc)	  confirmed	  as	  much.	  4	  Importantly,	  the	  said	  obstacle	  is	  merely	  revealed	  rather	  than	  triggered	  by	  the	  broader	  project.	  See	  below.	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theoretic obstacle in the engineer’s way: a wrong-kind-of-reasons problem.  
 To see this, note, first, that at the core of Cappelen’s taxonomy lies a 
distinction between semantic and non-semantic deficiencies. Now, of course, 
this need not be a sharp distinction, and in most cases it will not be so: likely, 
in most cases, we will only care about semantic deficiencies to begin with 
because of other types of detrimental effects they generate. For instance, likely, if 
van Inwagen is right and the concept of freedom is, indeed, inconsistent, this 
will have great potential for generating detrimental effects on theorizing with 
the concept of freedom.  
 I will come back to this later in the paper; for now, let us leave this 
complication aside, however, because it will not affect the discussion to follow 
in any way. For the purposes of this section, then, I will take the 
semantic/non-semantic deficiency distinction to be sharp. One interesting 
question that this distinction gives rise to is: how will these two core normative 
sources going to interact? Which will take primacy? The semantic or the non-
semantic ‘should’? While not strictly speaking implying it, 5  Cappelen’s 
taxonomy seems to sugegest the answer is: ‘the latter’. After all, the thought is 
that, even though a concept is semantically non-deficient, it might still be the 
proper target of the engineer in virtue of its detrimental moral, political etc. 
effects. Even if, say, our current concept of ‘woman’ is semantically perfectly 
functional, in virtue of the unfortunate social effects it bears, we are justified in 
proposing amelioration.  
 Here is one first worry with this: what if the concept at stake is, as a 
matter of fact, not only semantically perfectly fine, but also does exceptionally 
well epistemically, i.e. it carves nature at its joints, while, at the same time, we 
find that employing it has bad practical consequences? Concepts of species are 
the most straightforward illustration: take our concept of ‘deer’, for instance; it 
includes fallow deer, red deer, roe deer and muntjac deer. Say that it turns out 
that, in its current shape, it has terrible effects for the roe deer population. 
While not strictly speaking endangered, roe deer population is particularly 
vulnerable: up to 90 per cent die during their first year, due to heavy predation 
on fawns by foxes and by lynx in mainland Europe. Starvation and respiratory 
infections also take their toll. Now, say that, in virtue of this increased 
vulnerability, the fact that roe deer falls under the concept ‘deer’ has further 
terrible effects on the population: since, for instance, neither hunting nor 
protection legislation discriminates between roe deer and less vulnerable deer 
populations, roe deer is more likely to be hunted down, and less likely to be 
subject to protective measures.  Does this justify revising our concept of deer? 
Should we be responsive to the moral and political factors and abandon a 
perfectly functional concept, which, by stipulation, carves nature at its 
biological joints? Think, for instance, of all the epistemic work that such a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Since	  it	  only	  discusses	  cases	  of	  practical	  deficiencies	  in	  absence	  of	  semantic	  deficiencies,	  Cappelen’s	  framework	  is	  perfectly	  compatible	  with	  it	  being	  the	  case	  that,	  whenever	  there	  are	  semantic	  deficiencies,	  they	  will	  take	  precedence.	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concept can do for us, and which will be lost after moral amelioration.  
 Say that you are still inclined to believe the answer to this question is 
‘yes, we should revise!’. After all, arguably, moral permissibility is all-things-
considered permissibility: when different normative considerations come in 
conflict, moral reasons prevail.  Even so, the worry runs even deeper: say this 
paper is right, and reasons speaking in favor of fixing our representational 
devices equally support improving them. That is, our reasons for engineering 
need not be restricted to deficiencies.  Will it then be the case that that we are 
justified in engineering a perfectly functional concept for just any improvement 
that might be triggered by this effort? What are the restrictions – if any – to 
abandoning a semantically impeccable, joint-carving, practically non-deficient 
concept?  
 Take, for instance, again, the concept of ‘deer’. Say that, through some 
weird causal chain, engineering our concept in use so as to exclude red deer 
would improve the life expectancy of bumblebees, which, given that 
bumblebees pollinate crops, would, in turn, result in economic advantages.  
Should we exclude the most common type of deer from the extension of ‘deer’ 
on these counts? Should we take on the epistemic loss? Intuitively, this does 
not seem right.  
 What this discussion reveals is a wrong-kind-of-reasons problem for 
the ‘should’ in conceptual engineering: not just any practical/moral/political 
etc. gain seems to do the work in justifying ameliorating an epistemically good 
concept. If the conceptual engineering programme is likely to leave us with 
concepts that fail us epistemically, devoid of representational devices that we 
can employ in exploring the world around us, then maybe we should set our 
engineering ambitions aside.  What the programme needs is a normative 
limiting recipe. Taking its cue from the literature on the wrong-kind-of-reasons 
problem for deontological accounts of value, the next section concerns itself 
precisely with sketching one such tool. 
 
 
4. Epistemic Limits 
  
In the previous sections, I have argued that, at a closer value-theoretic glance, 
the conceptual engineering project should be both wider and narrower than 
extant proposals in the literature suggest. On one hand, the arguments put 
forth to justify fixing language equally support improving non-deficient 
representational devices. That’s the good news: the project can be broadened 
up. On the other hand, I have identified a wrong-kind-of-reasons problem for 
the said justificatory efforts: not just any improvement seems to have the 
necessary normative strength to support the ameliorative ambition. 
 To figure out how to distinguish between ‘the right kind’ and ‘the 
wrong kind’ of conceptual improvement, it will be useful to take a closer look 
in in the literature on the wrong-kind-of-reasons problem. In a nutshell, a 
reason is said to be ‘of the wrong kind’ when, although it counts as a 
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consideration broadly in favor of phi-ing, it fails to bear on whether phi-ing is 
valuable. To say that something is a wrong kind of reason, however, is not to 
say that it is a bad reason: some reasons of the wrong kind seem to provide 
excellent support for phi-ing, while still failing to render phi-ing into a valuable 
action or attitude. The central case in recent literature involves a demon that 
credibly threatens to punish you unless you desire or admire something X that, 
quite obviously, is not desirable or admirable. When the incentive is compelling 
enough, it apparently provides conclusive all-things-considered reason to 
believe, desire or admire X, if you can; but it is not a reason that shows X to be 
true, good or admirable. The fact that a demon will punish you unless you 
desire a cup of mud is the wrong kind of reason to desire the mud, since such 
an exogenous incentive obviously does not make the mud desirable (Crisp 
2000).  
 Another classical example features reasons for belief: if you offer me 
one million dollars for believing against all available evidence that you are not 
bald, I have conclusive, all-things-considered justification to believe that you 
are not bald. However, in virtue of failing to be epistemically justified to 
believe it, my corresponding belief is a bad belief, which, intuitively, I shouldn’t 
even be able to form to begin with. Prudential reasons are the wrong kind of 
reasons for belief, no matter what is all-things-considered required at the 
context.  
 One observation that is frequently made in the relevant literature is that 
reasons of the wrong kind do not pertain to the kind of thing the 
action/attitude in question is, to its central function. Belief, for instance, is a 
mental state the central function of which is an epistemic one: representing the 
world. As such, in virtue of this function, beliefs will be properly functioning 
when responsive to reasons that bear on this function, i.e. on epistemic reasons 
(see, e.g. [Simion 2017], [Graham 2012]). In virtue of their function of 
representing the world rather than, say, generating pleasure, beliefs will be 
malfunctioning when responsive to prudential rather than epistemic reasons, 
no matter what the all-things-considered contextual requirement is. If I know 
that you are bold in virtue of the fact that I can see it with my own eyes, I 
should not revise my belief due to moral, prudential or political concerns. 
 The above distinction nicely maps on to the difference between 
predicative and attributive uses of ‘good’. Predicative uses refer to good for 
one purpose or another,6 and thus latch on to all-things-considered obligations; 
in contrast, the attributive usage stands for what it takes for a token of a 
particular type to be good with regard to its type. Like in ‘a good hospital is a 
clean hospital’, or ‘a good knife is sharp’ or ‘good driving is safe driving’ 
(Geach 1956). In attributive usage, ‘good’ functions as a predicate modifier, 
rather than as a predicate in its own right. When we say that good knives are 
sharp, we say that knives qua knives are good only if they are sharp, no matter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  For	  those	  who	  believe	  in	  its	  existence	  as	  a	  sui	  generis	  type	  of	  goodness,	  also	  to	  good	  
simpliciter.	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whether, at the context, blunt knives would be all-things-considered better to 
have. The fact that good knives qua knives are sharp knives need not entail 
that good knives are good for the contextually salient purpose.  
 Importantly, this is not to say that attributive goodness does not trigger 
genuine ought-s. On the contrary, there is a clear sense in which hospitals 
ought to be clean, knives ought to be sharp and driving ought to be safe. Of 
course, this is still very vague, and further specification will likely result in value 
theoretical controversies. Fortunately, for our purposes here, these rough lines 
are all we need. The thought is, on a first approximation, that just in the way in 
which prudential, moral, political etc. considerations are the wrong kind of 
reasons for knowledgeable belief revision, they equally fail to support 
conceptual revision when the concept at stake is epistemically good, i.e. good 
as a concept. If our concept of ‘deer’ is epistemicaly perfectly functional and 
carves nature at its biological joints, moral, political etc. considerations, in 
isolation, will not be the right kinds of reasons to revise it.  Concepts, just like 
beliefs, are representational devices, their function is an epistemic one: to 
represent the world. In virtue of this function, concepts will be properly 
functioning when responsive to epistemic reasons, and malfunctional when 
responsive to practical reasons. Concepts will be good concepts qua concepts 
when they are epistamically good. 
 To sum up: according to the view defended here, not just any 
improvement legitimizes engineering a perfectly consistent, epistemically 
functional concept. If that is the case, though, the ameliorative ambition is in 
need of normative constraining. In the light of the discussion above, here is 
this paper’s proposal to this effect: 
 
The Epistemic Limiting Procedure (ELP): A representational device 
should be ameliorated iff (1) There is all-things-considered reason to do so and 
(2) The amelioration does not translate into epistemic loss. 
 
The proposal gives primacy to epistemic normative constraints in setting the 
normative boundaries for the ameliorative ambition. The resulting picture is 
wider than extant engineering proposals in the literature suggest, in virtue of 
not requiring conceptual deficiencies as justifications for amelioration. It is 
narrower in that it limits the ameliorative ambition to revisions that do not 
result in epistemic loss. Think of the example of ‘deer’ again: insofar as, in the 
process of revising the concept, we do not end up with less knowledge about 
the world, the engineer is free to proceed with revision for any good practical, 
moral, political etc. reason. However, no practical, moral, political etc. reason 
will support conceptual revision that obscures our view of the world. Of 
course, if the life of millions is at stake, revising a perfectly adequate 
representational device will be all-things-considered permissible. However, the 
resulting concept will not be a better concept, in virtue of being less likely to 
fulfill its central function; therefore no conceptual improvement will have 
taken place. The proposal is novel in that it gives primacy to epistemic 
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normative constraints on conceptual engineering. It is, however, in line with 
many extant views, in placing a heavy normative burden on the functions of 
the relevant concepts (e.g. [Haslanger 2000], [Plunkett and Sundell 2013]).   
 
 
5. Objections and Replies 
 
Now, with the proposed account at hand, I will turn to answering two 
important questions that arise concerning ELP: the first worry concerns the 
necessity direction involved in ELP, the second the sufficiency direction. If 
both are right, ELP is both too strong and too weak.  
 Let us start with the former: one important worry is that the ELP 
restriction will forbid intuitively worthwhile extant engineering projects. Take, 
for instance, again, the project of engineering the concept of ‘woman’. Again, 
say that there was nothing wrong with it from an epistemic point of view: it is 
a perfectly coherent concept, and, in its current shape has zero detrimental 
epistemic effects. Say, however, that it is morally, socially and politically 
defective, and it has substantive undesirable consequences for women’s lives. 
Should we not attempt to engineer? This does not seem right.  
 My answer to this question will lack much in the way of nuance: ‘No, 
we shouldn’t!’. Insofar as our concept of woman is epistemically perfectly 
functional, we should leave it be, for reasons pertaining to success in inquiry. 
Note, however, that it is not clear that this is an example of epistemically 
proper but morally deficient concept. More plausibly, I submit, what we have 
here is a concept that has bad social, moral, political effects in virtue of failing 
epistemically. Our concept is not impeccably depicting what women are, and 
still triggering bad moral and social outcomes; it does the latter in virtue of being 
epistemically deficient.  
 Recall that, after looking at Cappelen’s taxonomy of ameliorative 
‘should-s’, we noted that the distinction between theoretical and practical 
deficiencies, and the corresponding normative concerns justifying the 
engineering project, need not be as sharp as the taxonomy suggested: likely, 
most practical deficiencies will be sourced in epistemic deficiencies. Highly 
plausibly, also, we will only care about epistemic deficiencies to begin with 
because they tend to have bad moral, social, political etc. effects. ELP restricts 
the justifcatory field for the ameliorative project to just this (arguably) majority 
of cases: cases of practical failure in virtue of epistemic failure. It is arguable 
that the projects put forth in the literature belong here. 
 One slightly different incarnation of the worry would go along the 
following lines: it is not fair play to ask whether we should take on a new 
concept, and for what reasons, without specifying what use-context we’re 
asking about. Take ‘deer’ again: if the context of interest is biology, then it 
might be quite obvious that epistemic goals take primacy. If it’s policy making, 
then it might be equally obvious that practical goals take primacy. It need not 
be that, if we change concepts in one context, then we have to change them in 
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all others: we could keep the joint carving concept in use in the context of 
biology where it underwrites scientifically significant generalizations, and 
introduce alternative concepts in the context of (say) environmental policy 
making, where biological joints matter, but less so and not exclusively, and 
where the practical benefits of the alternative concept can be gained.7  
 Three things about this: first, it is not clear that going context-variant 
will help to remove the impropriety-in-spite-of-all-things-considered-propriety 
intuition discussed above. Think back to the (arguably) parallel case of belief:  
it might be that, for the purposes of one context or another, it is better to 
believe what one is prudentially justified to believe. For instance, in the case of 
patients with very serious conditions, there is empirical research strongly 
suggesting that wishful thinking can prolong life expectancy. Still, there 
remains an intuitively important sense in which beliefs formed as a result of 
wishful thinking are defective beliefs. The functionalist picture serves to 
explain this. 
 Second, going context relative might just push the problem at the level 
of a particular context, rather than solve it. The worry is that contextualism 
might not help much with the wrong-kind-of-reasons problem to begin with, 
since it looks as though it can reappear within context. After all, there is, 
plausibly, no such thing as inquiry-free domain. If that is true, we could have, it 
would seem, within the same context, conflicting epistemic and, say, moral 
considerations, at which point the same argument can be generated. 
 Last, it is not clear to what extent merely using a different concept in a 
restricted context would count as successful engineering to begin with.  
Something more seems to be needed: just because I and my family decide to 
use ‘deer’ to mean ‘cup of tea’ from now on, because that fits some family 
purpose or another, we surely do not count as having engineered the concept 
of ‘deer’. Note also that several authors offer examples of distinctively failed 
engineering projects where this is exactly what is going on: one body or 
another decides that concept x should be redefined as y in a particular context; 
Patrick Greenough (2017), for instance, brings up failed semantic engineering 
in totalitarian regimes in order to argue for their being such a thing as a 
‘control problem’ for engineering projects: even if, for fear of persecution, 
people start employing the concept at stake as indicated in the relevant context, 
it still does not seem as though that is a successful engineering attempt. What 
seems to be needed for intuitive engineering success, rather, is a wider, more 
substantive, wide soread change than that. 
 Of course, the fact that the threshold for successful engineering cannot 
plausibly be as low as the teacup case would have it, does not imply it will be 
maximally high. Nothing I have just said precludes there being a plausible a 
contextually variant alternative to the view defended here, together with a 
plausible proposal for a success threshold; of course, though, it will be on the 
shoulders of its champion to put such a proposal forth and to dispel the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Manny	  thanks	  to	  an	  anonymous	  referee	  for	  pressing	  me	  on	  this	  point.	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worries I have just laid out.  
 A different but very serious worry that arises about ELP is that it is too 
weak, in that it allows too many ameliorative projects in. To see this, recall that 
we have seen that some endorse a view on which language is constitutive of 
social reality (e.g. Searle 1995). If that is the case, when it comes to concepts 
representing social rather than natural kinds,  by conceptually engineering, we 
would be, in effect, changing the world. If our language is constitutive of social 
reality, conceptual engineering will amount to a form of social engineering.  
 Note that, in this case, by ELP, anything goes: after all, since as soon as 
one engineers a social kind concept, reality follows suit, it is unlikely to ever get 
epistemic deficiencies. As such, by ELP, any type and extent of improvement, 
no matter how marginal or limited, justifies an ameliorative project. Isn’t this, 
however, dangerously permissive? Should we, for instance, go ahead and 
engineer both the concept and the social institution of ‘money’ just for some 
minor positive effect this might have, say, on the price of tomatoes in New 
York? 
 Again, the answer is hardly nuanced: ‘Yes, we should’. I take this to be 
a feature of the account, not a defect. Of course, importantly, absent any 
central, epistemic concerns, the entire normative picture needs to be taken into 
consideration: we should carefully weigh all the normative constraints present 
at the context against each other: 0ne should not engineer for the sake of the 
New York tomatoes market, if this results in poverty in three small countries. 
Furthermore, importantly, one central consideration to be taken into 
consideration will be the opportunity cost of engaging in engineering and 
proliferating the use of the engineered concept. But if, absent epistemic 
concerns, the all-things-considered normative requirement is to improve a 
particular social kind concept, than this is exactly what we should do.  
 
 
6. Conclusion  
 
This paper has attempted to break new ground in the research concerned with 
the limitations of conceptual engineering: rather than looking into the 
metaphysical limits of ameliorative projects, it concerned itself with the 
normative limits thereof. In the process, I have identified one broadening up 
opportunity for the engineer, but also a wrong-kind-of-reasons problem. In the 
light of all this, I put forth a sketch of a proposal for normative constraining 
that gives primacy to epistemic requirements. 
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